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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) has raised protests in Indian Country when conservation 
restrictions threaten treaty rights and tribes’ sovereign use and 
management of trust resources. In 1997, the Departments of the 
Interior and Commerce (the “Departments”) sought to accommodate 
those concerns and issued Secretarial Order 3206 (“SO 3206,” or 
“Order”) to ensure enforcement would not violate the United States’s 
trust responsibility toward tribal nations. The Order provided non-
binding guidance to the Departments in their consultations with tribes 
and urged them to more thoroughly consider of the impact of species 
listing and habitat designation on tribal interests. A decade and a half 
later, SO 3206’s legacy is lukewarm. Agencies continue to treat 
consultation as an empty formality without effect on their discretion. 
Their actions remain unbound by the trust duty and sacred treaty 
protections.1 Therefore, SO 3206’s commitments should be reviewed, 
                                                                                                         
1 The federal trust duty is a distinctive obligation incumbent upon the United 
States to act fairly in its dealings with Indian nations. Its contours originate in 
the specific terms of treaties, statutes, and regulations. See United States v. 
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). Certain lower courts have ended their 
analysis there and held that any duty is discharged by mere compliance with 
such general positive law; see Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 
810 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[The trust obligation] does not impose a duty on the 
government to take action beyond complying with generally applicable statutes 
and regulations.”); The Supreme Court’s approach has not been so parochial. As 
the Court powerfully enunciated in Seminole v. United States, the trust duty 
goes beyond mere statutory compliance and represents a “moral obligation [] of 
the highest responsibility and trust.” Seminole v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 
297 (1942); It is “overriding,” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974), and 
necessary for the “fulfillment of . . . the national honor,” Heckman v. United 
States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912). See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora 
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Great nations, 
like great men, should keep their word.”). Thus, it extends beyond the words of 
the statute or regulation that gives it life, and like any instrument establishing a 
trust “many of the duties and powers are implied, . . . aris[ing] from the nature of 
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and its failures in application held to criticism. Old roads must be 
repaved and new ones mapped.  
Part I of this Article charts the history of tribal opposition to ESA 
enforcement and the government response in issuing SO 3206. Species 
listing and habitat designation threaten to impair treaty rights and 
restrict tribal nations in the sovereign use of their land. The issuance of 
incidental take permits threatens to allow non-Indians to destroy treaty 
resources. Against this background, tribes advocated for a rule that 
would mitigate these concerns. What they received was a non-binding 
policy order. Part I concludes with a discussion of that order. 
Part II takes up the criticisms levied against SO 3206 and identifies 
two major modifications to improve the operation of the ESA in 
Indian Country. First, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service should institutionalize the Order’s 
consultation guidance by systematically requiring federal negotiators 
to be committed, qualified, and able to affect project decisions. 
Second, the implicated agencies should revise SO 3206 to legally bind 
their discretion. The first modification draws upon tribal comments 
made on Department of the Interior (“Interior”) consultation policy 
while the second applies court precedent interpreting consultation 





                                                                                                         
the relationship established.” Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). The nature of that relationship is commonly analogized to the trust at 
common law and courts have presumed that when the federal government holds 
Indian property, it must do so in accordance with “more stringent standards 
demanded of a fiduciary.” Id.; see Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 at 225 (recognizing 
that when the federal government assumes “elaborate control” over Indian 
property, “[a]ll the elements of a common-law trust are present”). Though such a 
property arrangement certainly gives rise to a trust duty, it is not essential. Even 
when no property under federal title is involved, courts have required that 
federal agencies interpret their mandates and other law in a manner favorable to 
Indian peoples. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1445 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (declining to defer to the Department of the Interior’s 
interpretation of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act when the Department failed 
to heed the Indian canons of construction). Thus, for the purposes of this Article, 
the trust duty may not always command a result in the Indians’ favor but rarely 
ceases to bind the Services. When dealing with Indian property rights or acting 
in a way that affects Indian nations, that must strive after the Indian welfare.  
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF SECRETARIAL ORDER 3206 
On December 28, 1973, President Nixon signed the ESA into law. 
The ESA’s mandate was broad and substantive, expressing Congress’s 
"plain intent . . . to halt and reverse the trend toward species 
extinction, whatever the cost."2 Those costs, however, have been 
disproportionately borne by tribes in the exercise of their treaty 
rights to hunt and fish as well as in their efforts to manage and 
responsibly develop their land.  
The following traces the impact of the ESA in Indian Country and 
the burdens imposed by its provisions on species listing, habitat 
designation, and the issuance of incidental take permits. Against this 
background, it traces the response from tribal advocates, attorneys, and 
resource managers, leading to the drafting of SO 3206.  
 
A. Statutory Background: The Endangered Species Act in Indian 
Country 
The ESA threatens tribal interests by authorizing the Departments 
of the Interior and Commerce—through the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
(collectively “the Services”)—to infringe upon treaty rights to take 
listed species and freely use tribal lands that have been designated as 
critical habitat, while conversely permitting non-Indians to incidentally 
take treaty protected species they would not otherwise be entitled to.  
By listing endangered species, the ESA may unduly impair treaty 
rights to hunt and fish those same species.3 Tribes fought for centuries 
to protect these rights, ultimately securing their recognition by the 
United States in exchange for the massive land concessions that 
allowed American expansion. Improper enforcement of the ESA’s 
take prohibition threatens to abrogate those sacred rights without the 
express statutory language such abrogation requires.4 Indian treaty 
rights can only be abrogated when Congress’s language demonstrates 
                                                                                                         
2 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
3 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2003) (authorizing the Services to identify species in 
imminent danger of extinction or under threat to become endangered in the near 
future). 
4 The ESA defines “take” as conduct that serves to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” members of a listed species. 16 
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2003). This broad category embraces both hunting and 
fishing under treaty as well as the harms of wildlife through project development 
subject to an Incidental Take Permit discussed below. 
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the intent to abrogate after a careful consideration of the conflict with 
extant rights.5 These limitations are particularly significant in the 
context of natural resources where “tribal property rights and 
sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s intent to the contrary is 
clear and unambiguous.”6 Absent such language, the Supreme Court 
has been “extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of 
treaty rights.”7 Under such circumstances, statutes will not be held to 
abrogate treaty rights in “a backhanded way.”8  
The Supreme Court famously avoided determining whether the 
ESA abrogated treaty rights in United States v. Dion.9 In that case, the 
FWS arrested several enrolled Yankton Sioux Tribe members for 
hunting eagles on their reservation in alleged violation of the Eagle 
Protection Act and the ESA. The Indian arrestees defended their 
actions based on an implied hunting right under the 1858 Treaty 
signed with the Yankton Sioux.10 Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit 
recognized the right and refused to hold it abrogated, finding no 
“express reference” to abrogation “in either the Act[s themselves] or 
in the legislative history of the Act[s].”11 The court rejected the United 
                                                                                                         
5 See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 
(1999); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346, 353 (1941) 
(congressional intent to abrogate tribal property rights must be “plain and 
unambiguous”); See also Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (holding the Indian canons to trump agency deference); Ramah Navajo 
Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461–62 (10th Cir. 1997). 
6 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02(1) (2012 ed.) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202–03 (1999) (“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty 
rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do so. There must be clear 
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended 
action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve 
that conflict by abrogating the treaty.") (internal citations omitted). 
7 Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658, 690 (1979). 
8 Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968). 
9 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
10 Id. at 734. 
11 Admittedly, the conservation of endangered species may justify state 
regulation of Indian treaty fisheries shared “in common” with non-Indians under 
the relevant treaty. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(emphasis in original); The Puyallup Court however recognized this 
conservation exception in dicta and notably limited the regulatory power to 
resources in which the state shares a property interest, and only when under 
threat of the species’ extinction. When regulation would impair a treaty right, 
the State must provide sufficient justification for its exercise. See Department of 
Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973) (“[T]he police power of the 
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States’s argument that Congress’s rejection of a treaty right exemption 
in an earlier version of the ESA indicated the intent to abrogate.12  
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, focusing on the Eagle 
Protection Act rather than the ESA. An exemption for Indians to take 
eagles for religious purposes in the Eagle Protection Act showed the 
intent to abrogate implicated hunting rights. 13  Congress had 
considered Indian religious concerns and responded not by exempting 
treaty rights, but by creating “a regime in which the Secretary of the 
Interior had control over Indian hunting” through a permitting 
process.14 With the matter settled under the Eagle Protection Act, the 
Court declined to answer whether the ESA independently abrogated 
the petitioner’s treaty rights.15 The Supreme Court has never had 
another opportunity to answer that question. While in the Eighth 
Circuit the ESA does not abrogate treaty rights, such rights remain at 
risk everywhere else in Indian Country.16 
By listing a species, the Services may not only infringe upon a 
tribe’s sacred treaty right to take the species, but may also impose 
arduous conservation restrictions upon Indian lands by designating 
them “critical habitats” when occupied by the species or essential for 
its conservation.17 The Services must, during the classification process, 
consider scientific, economic, and “any other relevant impact[s],” and 
exclude otherwise suitable areas if the “benefits of exclusion outweigh 
                                                                                                         
State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the 
passenger pigeon; the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue 
the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.”); New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (“State jurisdiction is preempted by the 
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal 
interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient 
to justify the assertion of State authority.”). 
12 United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985). 
13 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986). 
14 Id. at 743–44. 
15 Id. at 746. 
16 Only one federal jurisdiction has held the ESA to abrogate treaty rights, 
finding the Act’s Alaskan Native subsistence exemption, and statutory language 
extending the ESA to “all persons” to sufficiently meet criteria. United States v. 
Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987). This decision has met 
extensive criticism. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act protects Alaskan 
native rights, whereas treaty rights are protected, of course, by treaty. Secondly, 
while in other circumstances, a law of general applicability may extend to 
Indians; this presumption can be defeated by an en point treaty guarantee. 
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
17 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2003). 
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the benefits of designation.”18 Those benefits are left undefined. It has 
nevertheless forced tribes to shoulder an unfair and disproportionate 
responsibility for conservation in environments largely degraded by 
non-Indian development, while ignoring tribal sovereign resource 
management rights.19  
Because tribal action so often includes a federal action ingredient, 
and since state, local, and private action20 in the vicinity of Indian 
lands will often be included in a Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) 
baseline, “a jeopardy determination is almost preordained to impose a 
heavier burden on Indian lands.”21 Because of this burden, ESA 
enforcement can disproportionately “delay, curtail[] or prohibit[] . . . 
development activities” in tribal construction and resource extraction, 
compared with non-tribal activities.22 The inclusion of tribal lands 
within designated critical habitats is “particularly offensive, in that it 
effectively imposes a federal zoning system on Indian lands by 
creating a wildlife ‘district’ zoned for habitat uses, while incompatible 
uses, such as [tribal] oil and gas development, must be undertaken 
                                                                                                         
18 Id. 
19 Because tribal development often takes place on trust land and never is 
uniquely subject to federal permitting jurisdiction, it is highly vulnerable to a 
jeopardy determination. The permitting agencies are required “in consultation 
with and with the assistance of the Secretary, [to] insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as an “agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species. 16 U.S.C. § 
1536(a)(2) (2003). A jeopardy determination therefore can obstruct tribal 
management and development far more than state or private equivalents 
undertaken off federal land. 
20 The ESA is triggered whenever there is an “ingredient” of federal 
involvement in the action. That ingredient is present in all “projects and 
programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved 
by federal agencies . . . . Actions do not include funding assistance solely in the 
form of general revenue sharing funds . . . with no Federal agency control over 
the subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not include bringing judicial or 
administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 
(2010). The federal jurisdiction over trust land, for example, will trigger a 
requirement for federal approval and thus present a federal ingredient. It is the 
federal action of permitting, rather than the tribal action requiring approval, 
which is directly subject to the ESA. 
21 Sandi B. Zellmer, Conserving Ecosystems Through the Secretarial Order on 
Tribal Rights, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 162–63 (Winter 2000) (calling tribal 
development proposals the “straw that . . . break[s] the camel’s back”). 
22 Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands As Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and 
Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. 
REV. 381, 398 (1998). 
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elsewhere.”23 Such “zoning” ignores the widespread development of 
competent and professional tribal management programs that seek to 
address conservation issues more holistically than the ESA’s single 
species approach.24 In this context, meaningful consultation becomes 
ever more necessary to ensure that tribal resources are maintained, the 
trust responsibility upheld, and conflict mitigated. 
The ESA infringes upon tribal taking rights not only by protecting 
species and habitat but also by opening them to non-Indian incidental 
take. If a non-federal actor proposes an action that will incidentally 
harm a listed species, she must apply for an Incidental Take Permit 
(ITP).25 The application must include a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP),noting the likely environmental impact of the incidental takes, 
as well as proposed steps for mitigation. The ITP is revocable if the 
permittee acts out of compliance with the permit, the associated HCP, 
or other applicable law.26 If either of the Services determines that the 
action will affect a listed species or critical habitat, formal consultation 
will be required, ending with the issuance of a BiOp, including 
consideration of the ITP.27  
Notably, the ESA does not require consideration of the impact on 
treaty rights or call for tribal involvement in the permit issuing process. 
For example, when hydroelectric giant PacifiCorp applied in the late 
2000s for an ITP to continue dam operations in the Klamath Basin, a 
region blanketed with Indian fishing rights, it submitted an HCP to 
NMFS.28  The application noted that such operations would take 
endangered and evolutionarily significant Coho salmon by lowering 
                                                                                                         
23 While such zoning is justified when protecting critical habitat from such 
development generally, tribal sovereignty, treaty rights, and the competence of 
tribal resource management programs demand a different approach and greater 
reluctance to infringe on tribal enterprises. Id. at 418.  
24 Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal 
Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1068 (1997). 
25 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2010). 
26 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2010); 50 C.F.R. § 13.27-28 (2001). 
27 As discretionary actions, the issuing of a permit and the accompanying 
Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) can be set aside if found to be “arbitrary and 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996). 
28 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 08EKLA00-2013-F-0014, EFFECTS OF 
PROPOSED KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATIONS FROM MAY 31, 2013, THROUGH 
MARCH 31, 2023, ON FIVE FEDERALLY LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED 
SPECIES (May 2013). 
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oxygen and raising temperature in the water, while filling it with 
disease.29 As a result, tribal harvest quotas would shrink in relation to 
the smaller fishery. NMFS subsequently approved the ITP and issued 
a 270 page BiOp in 2013, noting no serious consideration of treaty 
rights of local tribes or that in issuing the ITP, the United States had 
just given away the tribes’s fish.30 
 
B. Tribal Response to Endangered Species Act Enforcement 
Under the shadow of the ESA’s looming 1994 reauthorization, 
tribal resource managers and lawyers began to organize around the 
aforementioned concerns and examine legislative and administrative 
solutions, eventually deciding to pursue a Joint Secretarial Order.31 
Their inspiration was the 1994 Statement of Relationship negotiated 
by the FWS and the White Mountain Apache Tribe, which had 
pointed toward possible cooperative intergovernmental management 
based on the Tribe’s “institutional capacity to self manage its lands.”32 
White Mountain Apache Chairman Ronnie Lupe, who had negotiated 
the Statement, joined the call for a secretarial order. 
In response, Interior Secretary Babbitt and Commerce Secretary 
Daley agreed to consult with tribal representatives to develop such an 
order.33 Prominent representatives present at the negotiations included 
the FWS Deputy Assistant Secretary, the General Counsel for NOAA, 
treaty rights champion Billy Frank Jr., and Chairman Lupe.34 Federal 
negotiators received relevant and culturally competent education in 
advance and both parties developed comprehensive consultation 
protocols.35 Professor Charles Wilkinson described the federal party as 
an “informed, high-level team[—]in consultation with a fully involved 
Solicitor[—]. . . [and with] broad authority [to] report directly to the 
Secretary.”36 Secretary Babbitt called the resulting Secretarial Order 
3206 “the equivalent of a treaty,” born out of mutuality between 
                                                                                                         
29 Id. at 210. 
30 Id. 
31 Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal 
Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1074 (1997).  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1076. 
34 Id. at 1077. 
35 Id. at 1078. 
36 Id. at 1081. 
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sovereign governments.37 He expressed the hope that it would “banish 
forever the traditional treaty process that ha[d] been one sided, 
overbearing, and not infrequently unfair.”38  
 
C. Secretarial Order 3206: History and Substance 
The Secretaries signed SO 3206 “to ensure that Indian tribes do 
not bear a disproportionate burden for the conservation of listed 
species, so as to avoid or minimize the potential for conflict and 
confrontation.”39 Under the Order therefore, agencies must “consult 
with, and seek the participation of, the affected tribes to the maximum 
extent practicable” when an action may affect trust resources, tribal 
rights, or Indian lands (defined to include both trust and tribally held 
fee lands).40 Such participation may result in formal intergovernmental 
agreements on species management, delegations of conservation law 
enforcement, and the development of guidelines to accommodate 
tribal access to, and traditional use of, protected species or habitats.41 
In recovery actions, the Services commit to ensure “tribal 
representation, as appropriate, on Recovery Teams when the species 
occurs on Indian land . . . affected tribal trust resources, or affects the 
exercise of tribal rights.”42  
The Services must not only invite participation but must “give 
deference to tribal conservation and management plans” when action 
will affect resources on Indian lands and listed species.43 This requires 
training and sensitivity to tribal cultures,44 and to the unique legal 
                                                                                                         
37 Id. at 1086. 
38 Id. 
39 SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust 
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at § 1 (1997).  
40 Id. § 5(1). 
41 Id. § 6. 
42 Id. at Appendix § 3(E). Recovery Teams, as utilized by the Services, include 
representatives of all “appropriate agencies and affected interests in a mutually-
developed strategy to implement one or more recovery actions.” Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy 
on Recovery Plan Participation and Implementation Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34272-01 (July 1, 1994). That mutual development 
allows the Services’ effort to benefit from the members’ unique knowledge and 
expertise regarding the species, the factors affecting it, and the appropriate 
course of recovery. Id. 
43 Id. § 5(3)(B) (emphasis in original). 
44 Id. § 5(4). 
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status of Indian lands. 45  In developing Reasonable and Prudent 
Alternatives (RPAs), the Services must also consider “information on, 
but not limited to, tribal cultural value, reserved hunting, fishing, 
gathering, and other Indian rights or tribal economic development.”46  
In order to minimize adverse impacts on tribal lands and resources, 
the Services may only apply conservation restrictions to Indian lands 
under the following narrow circumstances, when: 
 
i) The restrictions are reasonably necessary for 
conservation.47 Tribal lands can only be designated as 
critical habitat if necessary for conserving a listed 
species “after evaluating the possibility of excluding 
such lands.”48  
ii) Their purpose cannot be achieved through the 
exclusive regulation of non-Indian actions.49  
iii) They are the least restrictive option in their impact 
upon tribal management, economic development, and 
treaty rights.50  
iv) They do not discriminate against Indians, as stated 
or applied.51  
v) Voluntary tribal measures are inadequate.52  
 
In the Habitat Conservation Planning context, the Services must 
request consultation with tribes. When other parties are involved in the 
action, the Services must “encourage [them] to recognize the benefits 
of working cooperatively with affected tribes” and advocate for tribal 
participation in HCP development.53 If other parties refuse to invite 
tribes into negotiation, the Services themselves shall consult with the 
affected tribes. 54  The product of these consultations must be 
considered in the development of RPAs and the Services must 
“[a]dvocate the incorporation of measures . . . that will restore or 
                                                                                                         
45 Id. § 5(2). 
46 Id. at Appendix § 3(B)(3). 
47 Id. § 5(3)(C)(i). 
48 Id. at Appendix § 3(B)(4). 
49 Id. § 5(3)(C)(ii). 
50 Id. § 5(3)(C)(iii). 
51 Id. § 5(3)(C)(iv). 
52 Id. § 5(3)(C)(v). 
53 Id. Appendix § 3(D)(2). 
54 Id. 
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enhance tribal trust resources.”55 Subsequent decisions must explain 
how the trust responsibility has been addressed and accounted for.56  
 
II. CRITICISMS OF SO 3206 AND SUGGESTED MODIFICATION IN TEXT 
AND APPLICATION 
For all its potential, SO 3206 bears a fatal flaw, stamped upon the 
Order by federal unwillingness to make the trust duty binding. Section 
2(B) disclaims that the Order “shall not be construed to grant, expand, 
create, or diminish any legally enforceable rights, benefits or trust 
responsibilities, substantive or procedural, not otherwise granted or 
created under existing law.” It only provides internal, non-binding, 
guidance.57 Unless this changes, SO 3206 will have more value for its 
rhetoric than for its reality. 
Because of the above disclaimer, SO 3206 has failed to alleviate 
many tribal concerns with ESA enforcement. Meaningful consultation 
remains elusive due to lack of federal investment in the process and 
any legal recourse for tribes. This Part of the Article presents two 
modifications to bolster the force of the Order. First, as tribes have 
advocated, the Services must institutionally ensure the negotiators they 
send to consultation are committed to the process. Second, the 
Departments of the Interior and Commerce must promulgate SO 3206 
as a binding regulation upon their agencies, clarifying that the tribal 
rights must be considered when implicated in any ESA analysis.  
 
A. The United States Must Ensure Service Negotiators are Committed 
to Meaningful Section 7 Consultation with Tribes 
The Services must invest time and resources to ensure meaningful 
consultation, if they expect tribes to do likewise. Currently SO 3206 
applies a higher level of commitment in consultation to actions within 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs’s (BIA) jurisdiction. This high standard 
must be 1) applied to any Service action implicating tribal concerns. In 
meeting these high standards, the Services should ensure their 
consultation negotiators have 2) received sufficient training regarding 
                                                                                                         
55 Id. Appendix § 3(D)(3). 
56 Id. Appendix § 3(D)(2) (After consultation with the tribes and the non-federal 
landowner and after careful consideration of the tribe's concerns, the Services 
must clearly state the rationale for the recommended final decision and explain 
how the decision relates to the Services' trust responsibility). 
57 Id. § 2(B). 
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tribal concerns. Such negotiators should 3) inform tribes throughout 
the decision-making process and detail their consideration of their trust 
duties in writing. They must have 4) sufficient institutional power to 
make the decisions at issue. Interior’s current consultation policy, 
shaped by 2011’s Secretarial Order 3317, takes steps in this direction 
and will be referenced where appropriate.58  
1. The Services Should Treat Consultation with the Same High 
Commitment SO 3206 Imposes on the BIA 
Currently, the BIA is held to a uniquely high consultation duty 
under SO 3206. The Order should be modified to bind all acting 
agencies within Interior and the Department of Commerce 
(“Commerce”) to an identical level of commitment. Under SO 3206 
Appendix § 3(C)(3), the Services are required to engage in far deeper 
consultation on BIA actions than on those proposed by other agencies. 
This consultation includes inviting tribes to meetings between the 
Services and BIA, as well as giving the tribes and outside experts the 
opportunity to provide pertinent scientific data, to review data in the 
administrative record, and to review biological assessments and draft 
BiOps.59  Conversely, in working with other action agencies, the 
Services are merely required to “notify the affected Indian tribe(s) and 
provide for the participation of the BIA in the consultation process,” 
and “encourage the action agency to invite the affected tribe(s) . . . to 
participate.”60 Further, in the more involved BIA consultation process, 
the Services are required to use tribal management plans “as the basis 
for developing any reasonable and prudent alternatives, to the extent 
practicable,”61 while in other contexts, they are merely required to 
“give full consideration to all [tribal] comments . . . and shall strive to 
ensure that any alternative selected does not discriminate against such 
tribe(s).”62 The former practice properly treats tribes as sovereigns 
                                                                                                         
58 Policy on Consultation With Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28446-01 (May 17, 
2011) (hereinafter Interior Policy); See SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3317 
(Department of the Interior Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes) (Dec. 01, 
2011). 
59 SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust 
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(a) (1997).  
60 Id. at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(b). 
61 Id. at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(a). 
62 Id. at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(d). 
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entitled to a government-to-government process while the latter 
merely allows them to file comments like other citizens.63  
Contrary to SO 3206’s distinction between the responsibilities of 
the BIA and those of the Services, all agencies of the “United States 
bear[] a trust responsibility toward Indian Tribes, [when dealing with 
Indians] which, in essence consists of acting in the interests of the 
tribes.” 64  This responsibility necessarily includes responsible 
consultation by all applicable Departments. Interior Secretary Sally 
Jewell recently affirmed this principle in Secretarial Order 3335, 
noting that “[a]s instruments of the United States that make policy 
affecting Indian tribes . . . the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of 
Reclamation, Fish & Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and the 
Department’s other Bureaus and offices share the same general federal 
trust responsibility toward tribes.”65 As such, Appendix § 3(C)(3) 
should be collapsed to apply the high standard elucidated for the BIA 
context to Services consultation with all Interior and Commerce 
agencies. Once the Services are held to that standard, they can deepen 
their commitment to consultation by improving the training, 
commitment, and capacity of their representatives.  
 
2. The Services Should Work with Tribes to Ensure 
Representatives are Better Trained to Engage with Treaty Rights 
and Tribal Concerns 
Representatives must be better trained to meet the high 
standard embodied in SO 3206. Under § 5(2) of the Order, the 
                                                                                                         
63 The Quechan Indian Tribe has argued that the mere consideration of tribal 
comments neglects the “difference between [public NEPA] comments and 
consultation.” Thane D. Somerville, Attorney for the Quechan Indian Tribe, et 
al., Re: Comments of Quechan Indian Tribe on Proposed Policy on Consultation 
with Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28446, II(J) (July 12, 2011) (hereinafter 
Quechan Comment). 
64 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Countless other cases have recognized the trust responsibility borne at every 
point in the federal government. See, e.g., Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 
121 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. 
Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) amended on denial of reh'g, 203 F.3d 
1175 (9th Cir. 2000) (regarding the Bureau of Reclamation’s duty); Nance v. 
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 710 (9th Cir. 1981); Osage Tribal Council ex rel. Osage 
Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999). 
65 SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3335 (Reaffirmation of the Federal Trust 
Responsibility to Federally Recognized Indian Tribes and Individual Indian 
Beneficiaries), at § 3(d) (Aug. 20, 2014). 
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Services recognized the unique legal status of tribes. Such 
recognition, however, requires ongoing education and training of 
federal representatives. Wilkinson notes that it was critical during 
SO 3206 negotiations to reserve “ample time for presentations on, 
and understanding of, the cultural, historical, and legal background 
. . . [as well as] the real world problems faced by field level federal 
and tribal administrators.” 66  Only then were “the federal 
negotiators, most of whom had previously spent little time on 
Indian matters, able to understand the true distinctiveness of Indian 
policy: the depth of the commitment of Indian people to preserve 
and protect tribal sovereignty, their homelands, the trust 
relationship, and Indian culture.” 67  In order to develop this 
understanding, tribes must be invited to develop and implement 
this training in order to ensure its efficacy.68 The Interior Policy 
outlines a training model to be facilitated Department-wide 
through the Department of the Interior University.69 This model, 
developed “in collaboration with . . . tribal colleges,” “promotes 
consultation,” “[o]utline[s] . . . duties concerning tribal interests,” 
and “[d]escribe[s] the legal trust obligation of the Federal-Tribal 
relationship,” all “with attention to the unique distinctions within 
Indian Country.” 70  SO 3206 should be modified to include 
development of such a model and make its immediate 
implementation mandatory. 71 
A proper training model, such as the one outlined by the 
Interior, will enable federal negotiators to develop truly bilateral 
consultation protocols and intergovernmental agreements.72 It will 
                                                                                                         
66 Wilkinson, supra note 32 at 1078; See Mccoy Oatman, Chairman, Nez Perce 
Tribal Executive Committee, Comments on Department of Interior Policy on 
Consultation with Indian Tribes (Mar. 14, 2011) (such education must extend to 
“federal Indian law, jurisdictional issues[,] treaty rights”) (hereinafter Nez Perce 
Comment). 
67 Id. at 1079. 
68 See Nez Perce Comment supra note 67. 
69 Interior Policy, supra note 59, § V. 
70 Id. 
71 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT’ OF 
COMMERCE, NOAA 13175 POLICY, NOAA PROCEDURES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-
GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION WITH FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES 
AND ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS § III (A) (Nov. 12, 2013) (hereinafter 
NOAA PROCEDURES). 
72 SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust 
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at Appendix § 5(2) (1997). 
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also allow federal decision makers to maintain a proper scope of 
consultation that ensures that input from affected tribes is heard 
and considered rather than overshadowed by the concerns of those 
without a stake. Such meaningful attention requires that agencies 
not “cast[] the net of consulting tribes too broadly, in a given 
action, thus unnecessarily increasing the burdens associated with 
consultation and simultaneously diminishing the effectiveness of 
consultation with Indian nations who are the most affected.”73 The 
Quechan Tribe has noted that agencies will often invite all tribes in 
their home state of Arizona to consult on a matter simply because 
the action will take place somewhere in Arizona.74 In the SO 3206 
context, overbroad consultation can allow unaffected tribes to 
influence the conservation management of resources and lands 
upon which directly affected tribes may depend. Tribal lands 
should not be put at risk of critical habitat designation because of 
the views of parties without interest.  
 
3. Services Representatives Should Inform Tribes Consistently 
Throughout the Decision-Making Process and Document their 
Consideration of their Trust Duties 
Under Appendix § 3(C)(2) of SO 3206, the Services must 
“[p]rovide copies of applicable final biological opinions to affected 
tribes to the maximum extent permissible by law.” In reality, however, 
the Services have impeded tribal access to such documents under the 
guise of federal disclosure laws. When they recommended 
improvements to the National Commission on Indian Trust 
Administration and Reform, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council 
contrasted the standard set forth in the Order to the current state of 
affairs wherein tribes are left, like any other party, “to the Bureaucratic 
Black Hole of the Freedom of Information Act.”75 Requiring tribes to 
officially request this information “leaves much to be desired” and is 
“applied grudgingly and responses are long delayed.”76 The Quechan 
                                                                                                         
73 Quechan Comment, supra note 64. 
74 Id. 
75 Leonard Masten, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, Commission 
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Tribe has noted the difference between allowing tribes the same rights 
as any American to request information, and insuring the Services 
inform them based on comity owed sovereign nations in a 
government-to-government relationship.77  
The commitment to keep tribes informed also requires that the 
Services respond more fully, after adequate consideration, to tribal 
concerns raised in consultation. As former Navajo President Ben 
Shelly noted, SO 3206 should be modified to require the agencies and 
Services to give “detailed explanation how each consulting tribe’s 
comments and recommendations were considered and incorporated 
into the decision, and if not, why not, and finally, how the decision is 
fully consistent with the Department’s trust responsibility.”78  
The failure to meet this standard is exemplified in the 
aformentioned 2013 Klamath Project Operations BiOp. The NMFS 
stated there that it had not had “sufficient resources to do more than a 
cursory evaluation” of tribal management plans and had not invested 
resources to evaluate it with involved agencies.79 Consideration of 
tribal plans too often stops at a “cursory look” as the Services wait 
until litigation to address the requirements for meaningful consultation 
or the possible exclusion of tribal lands.80  
Courts have long recognized that the trust responsibility requires a 
deeper and more sincere investment. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe 
of Indians v. Morton, 81  the District Court for the District of 
Columbia set aside an Interior rule delivering water from the 
Truckee Dam to a local district that would otherwise have flown 
into the Tribe’s lake, pushing the lake’s Indian fish towards 
extinction.82 Because the lake was “the Tribe’s principal source of 
                                                                                                         
77 Quechan Comment, supra note 64. 
78 Ben Shelly, President, The Navajo Nation, Re: Proposed Policy on 
Consultation with Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28446 (July 15, 2011) (hereinafter 
Navajo Comment). 
79 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 08EKLA00-2013-F-0014, EFFECTS OF 
PROPOSED KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATIONS FROM MAY 31, 2013, THROUGH 
MARCH 31, 2023, ON FIVE FEDERALLY LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED 
SPECIES, 204 (May 2013). 
80 Marren Sanders, Implementing the Endangered Species Act in Indian 
Country: The Promise and Reality of Secretarial Order 3206, JOPNA No. 2007-
1, 28 (2007), 
http://nni.arizona.edu/resources/pubs/jopna%202007_01_endangered.pdf. 
81 Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 
1972). 
82 Id. at 252. 
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livelihood,”83 the Interior had a trust duty to maintain its level for 
the Tribe’s use.84 Without further comment, the Secretary called 
his decision a “judgement [sic] call.”85 The court instead found that 
he had failed to show that call was “anything but arbitrary.”86 The 
trust duty, a “moral obligation of the highest responsibility and 
trust,” could not be abandoned to accommodate non-Indian 
interests.87 Rather, “[i]n order to fulfill his fiduciary duty, the 
Secretary must insure, to the extent of his power, that all water not 
obligated by court decree or contract with the District goes to 
Pyramid Lake.”88 The Departments should continue to heed this 
notion and prioritize fulfillment of the trust duty whenever possible 
without waiting for a court to order such decisions. To do so, they 
must enter consultation with the assumption that tribal concerns 
will actually affect decision-making.   
 
4. The Services Representatives Should be Vested with Sufficient 
Institutional Power to Make or Strongly Influence the Decisions at 
Issue 
Federal representatives must not only be trained and committed to 
consultation, but must have the clear authority to make decisions or 
“present tribal views to the . . . decision maker.”89 As noted by the 
Quechan Tribe, “[t]oo often, Interior has attempted to meet its 
consultation obligations by sending low-level staff members to meet 
with the Tribal Council.”90  The Services should rather strive to 
emulate what Professor Wilkinson called the “informed high level 
team in consultation with a fully involved solicitor . . . [and] broad 
authority [to] report directly to the Secretary” that negotiated SO 
3206.91 Modifying SO 3206 to specify this requirement will empower 
                                                                                                         
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 255. 
85 Id. at 256. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)). 
88 Id. 
89 Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.S.D. 1995). 
90 Quechan Comment, supra note 64. 
91 Wilkinson, supra note 32, at 1081. To ensure that appropriate representatives 
are chosen, it may be necessary that “[t]ribes should be afforded the opportunity 
to comment on potential candidates.” Mel R. Sheldon Jr., Chairman, The Tulalip 
Tribes, Comments from the Tulalip Tribes of Washington at DOI request; 
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tribes to impact final decisions. Interior Policy takes the proper steps in 
this direction by instructing the Departments to designate a Tribal 
Governance Officer with access to the Secretary, who will monitor 
compliance with the policy, promote consultation, and supervise 
similar Bureau level Tribal Liaison Officers.92 As with training, the 
designation of such dedicated personnel remains discretionary within 
Commerce and SO 3206 should be modified to require that it be 
mandatory.93  
The goals of SO 3206 will remain merely aspirational so long as 
the Services fail to embed them in their consultation procedures. The 
rule currently imposes a higher consultation standard on the BIA. This 
should be amended to apply equally to the Services. In implementing 
rigorous frameworks of consultation, the Services should work with 
tribes to devise training requirements to ensure negotiators have the 
requisite education on tribal concerns before entering consultation. 
Once consultation begins, the negotiators should insure tribes are kept 
informed throughout the decision making process. The negotiators 
should have sufficient institutional power to ultimately integrate tribal 
concerns into the decision reached. While such steps would improve 
consultation, they remain tenuous so long as they remain discretionary. 
Therefore, SO 3206 should be promulgated as a binding rule. 
 
B. Interior and Commerce Must Promulgate SO 3206 as a Regulatory 
Rule, Requiring Consideration of Tribal Interests and Binding Agency 
Discretion by the Legal Force of Treaty Rights 
Tribes challenging a failure to consult have been told repeatedly 
that SO 3206 has little substantive force of law. 94 Until tribes have 
                                                                                                         
Department of the Interior DRAFT Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes 
(Mar. 11, 2011). 
92 SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust 
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at § VII(B) (1997). 
93 NOAA PROCEDURES, supra note 72, § III(B). 
94 Two district courts have recognized the Order’s failure to bind Government 
action. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 2d 
1328, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2006). The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians challenged the 
failure of FWS and Army Corps of Engineers to consult in order to avoid 
jeopardizing an endangered sparrow. Id. Count VI of their complaint alleged 
that the federal defendants had “violated the Indian Trust Doctrine as reflected 
in . . . Department of the Interior Secretarial Order # 3206.” Id. The court held 
that his argument failed to assert a claim because the Order was “for guidance 
within the Department only,” and does not create a substantive trust obligation. 
Id. Similarly in Center for Biological Diversity, the plaintiffs, including two 
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“legal recourse to guarantee that the . . . agencies comply with their 
[consultation] duty,” the commitments in SO 3206 will remain 
“disingenuous.”95 The Order should therefore be promulgated as a 
binding rule acquiring the force of law through integration into the 
meaning of the statute, by clarifying: 1) the “other relevant impact[s]” 
that must be considered in a BiOp include impacts on tribal interests; 
and 2) federal discretion remains subject to tribal rights as relevant 
“applicable law.” Through rulemaking, tribes will gain their legal 
recourse to sue under the APA when the Services act arbitrarily and 




                                                                                                         
tribes, asked the court to set aside an FWS finding that the desert eagle, an 
important trust resource, was not a bald eagle population entitled to ESA 
protection. Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, No. 10–2130–PHX–DGC, 
2011 WL 6000497 (D. Ariz. 2011). While finding that the Service had engaged 
in some mediocre consultation that “undoubtedly [could] have been more 
meaningful to and respectful of the tribe, the court did not find SO 3206 to 
“carr[y] with it specific, measurable consultation requirements that have the 
force of law in the ESA context.” Id. at *11, 13. 
95 Navajo Comment, supra note 79. 
96 The Eighth Circuit has also recognized that discretionary policy directives 
may acquire the force of law when they create a justified expectation of tribal 
consultation. In Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, the court found that the 
BIA was bound by its internal Personnel Management policy to consult the 
affected tribe. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717 (8th 
Cir. 1979). The policy had created a “justified expectation on the part of the 
Indian people that they will be given a meaningful opportunity to express their 
views before Bureau policy is made.” Id. at 721. In failing to afford that 
opportunity, the BIA “not only violate[d] those general principles which govern 
administrative decision-making, but also violates the distinctive obligation of 
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and 
sometimes exploited people.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted) 
(finding “that the two meetings of the tribal delegates with Washington 
officials” did not constitute meaningful). See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 
911 F. Supp. 395 (C.D. S.D. 1995); Fort Berthold Land and Livestock Assoc. v. 
Great Plains Regional Dir., 35 IBIA 266 (2000) (holding that even if tribal 
consultation guidelines did not establish “a right enforceable in Federal court,” 
they may nevertheless establish such a right before “the Board, which speaks for 
the Secretary of the Interior”96). Contra Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 
F.2d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that unlike in Oglala Sioux Tribe of 
Indians, the BIA did not concede the Personnel policy to be binding. This 
distinction was expressly rejected in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe). 
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1. As a Rule, SO 3206 Should Include the Impact on Treaty Rights in 
its Consideration of the “Other Relevant Iimpacts” the Services Must 
Consider in the BiOp Process 
In order to make SO 3206 binding, the Services should clarify that 
consideration of tribal concerns constitutes a vital component of 
Section 7 consultation. They can do so by including “information on, 
but not limited to, tribal cultural value, reserved hunting, fishing, 
gathering, and other Indian rights or tribal economic development” 
referenced in SO 3206 in their ESA-required consideration of the 
“other relevant impact[s]” of federal actions.97 With such a hook in the 
statute, SO 3206 allows tribal factors to shape the required analysis of 
when the “benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of 
designation.”98 
The Ninth Circuit has found that otherwise non-binding internal 
directives may create a consultation requirement when such a statutory 
hook is found. Within the last few years, the Te-Moak Tribe of 
Western Shoshone Indians has repeatedly challenged BLM 
authorizations for mining at the tribe’s holy site, Mount Tenabo, in 
Nevada. 99  The tribe has argued that the authorizations violated 
Executive Order 13007 because they failed to “accommodate access to 
and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious 
practitioners and . . . avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of 
such sacred sites.”100 Like SO 3206, Executive Order 13007 was non-
binding.101 Consequently, the court found that Executive Order 
13007 had “no force and effect on its own.”102 However, “its 
requirements were incorporated into [the Federal Land Policy 
Management Act (FLPMA)] by virtue of FLPMA’s prohibition on 
                                                                                                         
97 SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust 
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at Appendix § 3(B)(3) (1997). 
98 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2003). 
99 Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of the 
Interior, 565 F. App'x 665 (9th Cir. 2014); S. Fork Band Council Of W. 
Shoshone Of Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009). 
100 Id. (citing Indian Sacred Sites, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 § 2(a) (May 4, 2006)). 
101 Indian Sacred Sites, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 § 4 (May 4, 2006) (stating the order 
“intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and 
is not intended to, nor does it, create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party against the 
United States, its agencies officers, or any person”). 
102 Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev. v. U.S. DOI, 565 F. App'x 
665, 667 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands,”103 and the BLM 
was thus required to comply with the Executive Order.104 As a 
promulgated rule, SO 3206 should emulate the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation and explain that consideration of impacts on tribal 
interests form an integral component ESA analysis.105 
 
2. The Departments Should Promulgate Rules Recognizing that Treaty 
Rights are “Applicable Law” Constraining Service Discretion 
SO 3206 should also be modified to clarify that tribal rights are 
“applicable law” requiring compliance in the federal permitting 
process. This is especially true in the Incidental Take Permit 
context where permitted take may cut into tribal property 
interests. 106  According to ITP regulations, a permit may be 
suspended or revoked at any time if the permittee “is not in 
compliance with the conditions of the permit or with any 
applicable laws or regulations governing the conduct of the 
permitted activity.”107 Tribal rights have already been recognized 
                                                                                                         
103 Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988)). 
104 S. Fork Band Council Of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. DOI, 588 F.3d 718, 
724 (9th Cir. 2009). 
105 The ESA statutorily requires such a consideration when species listing or 
critical habitat designation will impair Alaskan Native take for “primarily . . . 
subsistence purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1) (2010). The prohibitions that 
would otherwise flow from listing or designation do not apply under such 
circumstances. Instead the statute requires the relevant department engage in 
formal rulemaking to “regulat[e] . . . the taking of such species by any such 
[Alaskan] Indian, Aleut, Eskimo, or non-Native Alaskan resident of an Alaskan 
native village.” Id. § 1539(e)(4). Such rulemaking must satisfy the APA and 
only “be prescribed after a notice and hearings in the affected judicial districts of 
Alaska . . . and shall be removed as soon as the Secretary determines that the 
need for their impositions has disappeared.” Id.; See SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 
3225 (Endangered Species Act and Subsistence Uses in Alaska), at § 3 (Jan. 19, 
2000) (requiring extensive consultation with the Native community as a 
component of the rulemaking process). This process requires a recorded hearing 
by the Secretary before an administrative law judge showing that “such 
regulation, assessment, determination, or finding is supported by substantial 
evidence.” Id. § 1371(b)(3). Arguably treaty guaranteed take deserves even 
further protection, lest an “impotent outcome” result from “negotiations and a 
convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of the Nation for 
more.” United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905). 
106 See Winans, 198 U.S. at 382 (“the right was intended to be continuing against 
the United States and its grantees as well as against the State and its grantees”). 
107 50 C.F.R. § 13.27–28 (2001). 
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as “applicable law” in general fishery management, and should be 
similarly recognized in the ESA context.108 
In Parravano v. Babbitt, the District Court for the Northern 
District of California looked to the Department’s trust 
responsibility in the context of managing “a chinook population 
too small to satisfy the needs of all who have a stake in the 
Klamath salmon.”109 Facing such scarcity, non-Indian fishermen 
challenged the Commerce’s Klamath Chinook ocean harvest rate 
that had been calculated in order to protect the Yurok and Hoopa 
tribal fisheries. The court upheld the harvest rate, explaining that 
under a Commerce rule, “the federally reserved fishing rights of 
the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes . . . are applicable law for the 
purposes of the Magnuson Act.”110  
The Commerce rule was promulgated pursuant to a 1991 
Solicitor’s opinion, which did not restrict its analysis to the 
Magnuson Stevens Fishery Management context, but rather 
recognized that “all parties that manage the fishery, or whose 
actions affect the fishery, have a responsibility to act in accordance 
with the fishing rights of the Tribes.”111 That responsibility of all 
parties required the United States to ensure that other users of the 
fishery “not interfere with the Tribes’ right to have the opportunity 
to catch their share,”112 regardless of the purpose for which the fish 
                                                                                                         
108 Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F.Supp. 914 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 539 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
109 Id. at 914. 
110 Id. at 920–21 (citing Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 68063 (Dec. 23, 1993)); see 
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding fishing 
rights to be “express federal law”). 
111 John. D. Leshy, Fishing Rights of the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes, M-
36979, 30 (1993). 
112 Id. at 28. This property is protected against interference by non-Indian 
overharvest, catch limitation, exclusion, and wrongful environmental harm. The 
first three have been recognized in case law on the protection of treaty fishing 
rights. The last is a longstanding principle of the common law that “[w]here a 
person's fishery rights are wrongfully interrupted or interfered with by another, 
he or she may maintain an action of trespass or action for damages for the injury 
caused thereby.” 36A C.J.S. Fish § 20. See Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 
(W.D. Wash. 1980) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982) on 
reh'g, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Supreme Court all but resolved the 
environmental issue when it expressly rejected the State’s contention . . . that the 
treaty right is but an equal opportunity to try to catch fish.”). 
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were taken.113 The Solicitor considered the seniority of tribal rights 
and further noted, “an argument could be made that the tribal 
moderate standard of living needs should be satisfied first, before 
other user groups can be afforded fishing privileges.”114  
Ultimately, such an approach best conforms to the Indian 
canons of construction that demand treaties be read as the Indians 
would have understood them. The Indian leaders who negotiated 
those treaties would surely find it an “impotent outcome to 
negotiations . . . which seemed to promise more” to see their 
protected rights gutted by uncompensated take of the species upon 
which they depended.115 They understood the protection of those 
rights to stand with the force of law, rather than to bend in the 
unfettered winds of agency discretion. Court precedent in other 
statutory contexts urges consideration of the impact on tribal 
interests and the recognition of treaty rights in listed species as part 
of binding “applicable law,” barring the Services from permitting 
non-Indian take of those species unless founded upon an express 
congressional abrogation of those rights.116 
                                                                                                         
113 Id. at 21 (noting that the tribes’ rights were based “the degree of dependence 
on the fishery resource at the time the reservation was created or expanded, 
rather than on what the particular uses were made of the fish”). 
114 Id. at 26. 
115 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905). 
116 See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 
(1999). Ultimately many treaty rights constitute not only “applicable law” but 
also extant property rights that cannot be taken without just compensation. See 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). In Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, the Supreme Court recognized that treaty language “secur[ing]” a tribal 
right to “take” salmon in a “relatively predictabl[e] . . . harvest” guaranteed 
more than “merely the opportunity to try to catch” fish. Washington v. Wash. 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 678 (1979) (internal 
citations omitted). Such an expectation property interest has substance. As 
recognized long ago, “the notion is intolerable that a man should be protected by 
the law in the enjoyment of property once it is acquired, but left unprotected by 
the law in his effort to acquire it.” Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am. etc., 73 
N.J.L. 729, 742–43 (1906). Tribes with such rights hold them in co-tenancy with 
non-Indian fishermen and entitles the tribe to 50 percent of the fishery “[a]bsent 
a judicial determination that a fifty percent share is no longer needed.” Allen H. 
Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal Property 
Rights?, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 153, 162 n.57 (1996) (citing 
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685). This allowance for reduction does not 
invalidate the property interest. Water rights acquired by prior appropriation are 
treated no differently. Furthermore when the federal government sets land aside 
for an Indian reservation, it implies a reservation of necessary waters. Winters v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). Similarly when the United States 
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SO 3206 sets an admirable standard but it is one that will not 
be met until Services personnel are qualified to meaningfully 
engage tribal involvement in ESA matters. While not exhaustive, 
this Article has urged two steps forward to that goal. First, the 
Services can engrain the Order’s purpose more deeply in their 
consultation procedures. The services can do so by ensuring its 
negotiators are committed to the consultation process, sufficiently 
educated to do their duty, and empowered to integrate tribal 
concerns into the decision making process. Second, the Services 
can promulgate the Order as a binding rule rather than a mere 
policy suggestion. Federal courts have shown the way, interpreting 
the Departments’s statutory responsibility to impliedly incorporate 
tribal concerns and policy documents on tribal involvement. As an 
interpretive rule, SO 3206 should clarify that those concerns and 
the treaty rights they rest upon are applicable law restricting the 
Services’s actions under the ESA.  
CONCLUSION 
3206 was, in its time, an admirable step forward. In order to 
respond to tribal concerns, two departments committed the time and 
resources necessary to negotiate through educated and empowered 
representatives. Their commitment produced a document that seeks to 
ensure a central place for tribal concerns in ESA Consultation and 
Habitat Conservation Planning, to urge a reluctance to designate 
critical habitat, and a willingness to defer to tribal management. The 
legacy of that commitment, however, has been lukewarm. The Order 
should thus be modified to ensure that agencies do not treat 
consultation as an empty ritual but as a sacred duty demanding the 
involvement of committed and educated decision makers. Ultimately, 
its uneven impact will only be improved if SO 3206 is modified to 
bind the relevant agencies to legally require consideration of tribal 
rights before federal action is taken. Only then can the ESA be 
reconciled with the United States’s trust duty. Only then will the 
federal government have to recognize that Indian lands are critical 
habitats primarily for tribal nations, and that endangered treaty rights 
deserve as much protection as the species upon which they depend. 
                                                                                                         
recognizes a right to take fish, it reserves a portion of that fish stock itself that 
should be equally recoverable in damages. 
